Imputation both of Christís Active and Passive
††††††††† Mr. John Goodwin in his Treatise of justification part 2, ch. 2, lays down several conclusions, whereby he might overturn this truth: and what he says must be examined.
††††††††† His first conclusion is this. He, for whose sins a plenary satisfaction hath been made (either by himself, or another for him) and hath been accepted by him, against whom the transgression was committed, is as just and righteous, as he that never sinned, but had done all things, that were requisite and meet for him to do. Answer: If by just and righteous be meant one who only hath not deserved the punishment threatened; then his conclusion is true: but if by just and righteous be meant one who hath not only hath not deserved the punishment, but hath also deserved the reward promised; then his conclusion is false; for the satisfaction, if it respect only the transgression committed, can only put the man, for whom it is given and accepted, in the state of one, that is under no obligation to be punished: but it cannot put him in the state of one, who not only is not to be punished, but is also to be rewarded. He adds, This is evident; because there is as much justice and righteousness in repairing the wrongs and injuries done to any, as there is in abstaining from doing wrong. Answer: True, in reference to the wrong done; and therefore such a one is rightly and justly delivered from the obligation to punishment; but is not made so righteous, as to challenge the reward, till a more complete satisfaction be made, to wit, such as may comprehend also perfect conformity unto the law in all points, to the end, he, for whom this is done, may be looked upon as a fulfiller of the law,
he would have had, if he had in his own person perfectly kept it. He that simply repairs the wrong done does not that which deserves the reward. The simile he annexes confirms this, and demonstrates how far out he is, as to our case. He that by his cattle, or otherwise, hath made spoil in his neighborís corn, and hath given him full satisfaction for the spoil done, to his contentment, is as good a neighbor, and deals as justly and honestly with him, as he that never trespassed in that kind upon him. How impertinent this is, as to our case, any may see; or he must say that there was no reward promised to Adam, upon his perfect obedience; and that the words, do this and live, had no place in the Covenant made with him. The satisfying neighbor deserves no reward, nor was there any reward promised to him, upon condition of his being a good neighbor. He adds, The essence and nature of justice or righteousness is suum cuique tribuere, to give to every man his own, i.e. that which is his own in a way of equity and right, is due from us unto them. Answer: But that which Adam was obliged to give to God, as his own, was glory, by faithful and constant obedience, that he might receive the reward to the glory of Godís faithfulness and goodness. Now when Adam dishonored the Lord by disobedience, and robbed him (as it were) of his authority, as just and righteous Governor, a satisfaction for the wrong done, excluding positive and full obedience unto the law, is not giving to God all that is due to him. Now (says he) when we have injured or damnified any man, in any of his rights, or things belonging to him, there is nothing more due to him, than that which is his own, i.e. that which is fully valuable to the injury we have done unto him. Therefore he that tenders a valuable consideration or satisfaction for an injury done to another, is just, according to the height and utmost exigency of justice; and consequently as just, as he that never was injurious or did wrong. †Answer: All of this is to no purpose, as to our question; for it is not betwixt God and us: nor was it betwixt God and Adam, as it is betwixt one man and another. God is to be considered as a Supreme Law-Giver and Ruler, enjoining obedience to his laws, under penalties, and promising rewards unto obedience: Now when his laws are broken, he is doubly injured, and the breaker is obliged unto punishment, and also forfeits his expectation of the reward. When satisfaction is made, and withal no complete obedience to the law, the person is by the satisfaction made, only exempt from the obligation to punishment, but hath thereby no right to the reward promised, until the Law be completely obeyed.
††††††††† His second conclusion is this: There is no medium between a perfect absolution and freedom from all sin; and a perfect and complete righteousness: but he that is fully discharged and freed from sin, ipso facto, is made perfectly and completely righteous. Answer: The same distinction, which we made use of in the other conclusion, will help us here. If by perfectly and completely righteous be meant one that is liable to no punishment, it is true, that he who is fully discharged and freed from sin, is made perfectly righteous, but if by perfectly and completely righteous be meant one that moreover hath a right to the recompense of reward that is promised, then it is false: freedom and absolution from sin respects only guilt, and dissolves the obligation to punishment, and in
that respect, is a perfect and complete righteousness; i.e. the person, so absolved, is as free of punishment, or of obligation thereunto, as if he had never sinned; but having sinned, he cannot by this dissolution of the obligation to punishment be ipso facto made as perfectly and completely righteous, as he would have been, if he had never transgressed, but had perfectly kept the Law; for if he had perfectly kept the law, he had obtained full right to the reward, which now he hath not, and which no pardon, or discharge, as such, can restore him unto. Let us hear his reason. Nothing (says he) can any way diminish, or prejudice the perfection of righteousness, but only sin, as nothing can hinder the perfection of light, but darkness in one degree or another. So that as the air, when it is free from all degrees of darkness, must of necessity be fully light; so he that is perfectly freed from all sin, must of necessity be fully and perfectly righteous. Answer: This would make us believe, that he is here speaking of sin itself, and not of its guilt and demerit, and so the opposite hereunto must be holiness; which expels sin (in a manner) as light doth darkness, or as one quality doth its contrary. But then he is fighting, all this while, against his own shadow, for we are speaking of the guilt of sin, which also must be properly understood, (and nothing else can) when he spoke of absolution and freedom from sin, in the conclusion. If he speaks here of sin in respect of guilt and demerit, his simile doth not quadrate; and opposite to this guilt he should set righteousness or obedience with its merit: and if any will do this, they shall easily see the mistake, for though a man hath not transgressed, yet he hath not eo ipso right to the premium, for in order to this, more days work may be required than one or half of one dayís work; far less can the pardon of or satisfaction for this transgression, give a man right to the reward.
††††††††† He adds, It is impossible to conceive a man defective in any part of righteousness, and yet withal to conceive him free from all sin: sin and righteousness being in subjecto capaci, contraria immediate, as Logicians speak. Answer: Defective in Righteousness may be either understood in respect of the mere duty or command, or in respect of full right to the reward. In the first sense, such a one cannot be free of all sin; but taking it in the second sense, he may: as for example, when one is to work eight days in dressing a garden, and then to receive the reward promised, and if he fail in his work any of the days, to be punished; this man, so long as he works 2, 3, 4, or 5 days, cannot be charged with sin, nor said to be defective as to his duty; and yet he hath not full right to the reward until he hath wrought eight days, but is defective in some part of his righteousness, as to this reward. And according to this may we understand that logical axiom.
††††††††† Further he says, The Scriptures themselves still make an immediate opposition, between sin and righteousness. To find out a third estate between sin and righteousness, we must find out a third Adam, from whom it should be derived. Answer: The state of sin and of righteousness, whereof the Scriptures speak, indeed admit of no medium, or third betwixt them, and the reason is because, we are all now born in a state of sin, and are obnoxious to wrath; and remain so, until we be translated into a state of righteousness, which is not
by mere pardon of sins, but also by the imputation of a righteousness; for being in this state of righteousness, we have not only the obligation to wrath and eternal punishment removed, which is done by remission upon the account of the satisfaction of Christ imputed; but we have also a right to the reward, the crown of life, which is had by imputation of righteousness, or of obedience, though it were better to say, we have both by both; or we have both by the imputation of that complete satisfaction and merit, which comprehends, or consists of both.
††††††††† His third conclusion is this: Adam, while his innocence stood within him, and till his fall by sin, was completely righteous, and in an estate of justification before God: Yea, for the truth and substance of righteousness, as righteous, as he could or should have been, if he had lived to this day, in the most entire and absolute obedience to the law. Answer: Adam, while he remained innocent, was completely righteous, that is, was chargeable† with no transgression, it is true: that he was completely righteous, that is, had full right to the reward, as having done all his duty, and completed his work, it is most false. Therefore (2.) it is false to say, he was in a state of justification, unless nothing else be hereby meant, than that he was not in a state of condemnation. Though there be no mid betwixt these two now, as to us, but either we must be in a state of justification, or in a state of condemnation; Yet Adam while he stood, was neither; Not in a state of condemnation; because he had not yet transgressed the law; nor yet in a state of justification, because he had not yet done all his duty; for he was to persevere in obedience to the end: and if he had been justified, he had full right to the reward, and so had been glorified, for whom the Lord justifies, he glorifies: But Adam was not glorified upon his law obedience, and consequently was not justified by his Law-Obedience. (3.) The truth and substance of righteousness (unto which he would restrict all) is not the thing enquired after, nor is it at all to the point; for upon Adamís having of that simply, he could not expect the reward of life that was promised, because the covenant he was under required continuance and perseverance in all the several duties, called for by the Law, even to the end, ere he could challenge a right to the reward: And further, Adam had this truth and substance of righteousness at the first, and it was concreated with him; yet he could not, upon that account have challenged glory, as his due.
††††††††† He adds, Even as the second Adam was as completely and perfectly righteous from the womb, and so from his first entrance upon his public ministry, as he was at last, when he suffered death. Answer: If we speak of our Lord Jesus, as the second Adam, that is, as standing in the room of sinners, as the head and public person, engaging in their behalf, whom he did represent, to pay all their debt; though he knew no sin, and upon that account was perfectly righteous, and separate from sinners; yet he was to finish the work laid upon him, and to perform the whole debt, both of duty and suffering, which he had undertaken; and till the last penny of that debt was paid, his work was not finished, and until his work was finished, he could not challenge his reward: and so this confirms what we have said of the first Adam.
††††††††† To say (he adds) that Adam was not perfectly righteous, and consequently in a justified estate or condition before God, until his fall by sin, is to place him into an estate of condemnation before his sin, there being no middle or third estate betwixt these two. Answer: This was obviated before. Adamís state before his fall was a state of innocence, wherein he enjoyed the favor and presence of God, he being perfectly righteous, in reference to that state; and to what was required of him; but justified he was not; for the reward was not adjudged unto him. So that, as to him, there was a middle state betwixt a state of justification and a state of condemnation; though as to us, there is not, as the places which he cites afterward namely Romans 5: 18, 8: 1, 2 show, and the whole Scriptures evince.
††††††††† He closes this matter thus: Therefore to grant, that forgiveness of sins puts a man into the same estate and condition, wherein Adam stood before his fall (which is generally granted by men of opposite judgment in this controversy; and nothing granted neither in this, but the unquestionable truth) is to grant the point in question, and to acknowledge the truth labored for, throughout this whole discourse. Answer: It is not granted that remission of sins, as such, puts a man every way into the same condition, wherein Adam stood before his fall; for it puts not a man in the same estate of inherent holiness, wherein Adam was; but it puts the man into the same estate of freedom from any obligation to punishment, for it takes away the reatus poenae, so that a pardoned man, as such, is no more under the actual obligation unto the curse and wrath of God, threatened for transgression, than Adam was before he fell: and this is all that is confessed. Which is far, yea very far from granting the point that he goes about to establish: for he would have remission, as such, put as man in the state of full right to the reward, to the end he might exclude the imputation of the obedience or righteousness of Christ as being necessary unto this end, contrary to the truth of Scripture. Adam, before he fell, had not right unto the promised reward, because he was to finish his course of obedience, before he could obtain that: and therefore the granting, that remission puts a man into the same condition, wherein Adam stood, will contribute nothing to his end.
††††††††† His fourth conclusion is that perfect remission of sins includes the imputation or acknowledgment of the observation of the whole law; even as the imputation of the law fulfilled, necessarily includes the non imputation of sin, or the forgiveness of all sin, in case any hath been committed. Answer: The conclusion is manifestly false, if we speak of remission simply, and abstractly as such; and the ground here alleged for it is ambiguous; for the imputation of the Law fulfilled, may either be to such as never broke it, and then it doth not include remission, but takes away all necessity of it; or to transgressors, and then indeed it may presuppose remission, but doth not include it, as such. But to remove ambiguities, we shall distinguish, and say that perfect remission of sins includes the acknowledgment of the observation of the whole law, in respect of punishment; but not in respect of the reward; that is, perfect remission of sins exempts a man from punishment, as well as if he had perfectly kept the law; but does not give him right to the reward;
for unto this was requisite the perfect observation of the law: Now perfect observation of the law says there was no transgression; but remission says, and supposes, that the law was not perfectly observed. So the imputation of the law fulfilled either says, the Law was not broken, or that now satisfaction is made for the breach thereof, and therefore the person, unto whom this imputation is made, hath a right unto the reward, which this† imputation doth directly and immediately respect, as such. But in our case, both of these go together, perfect remission, and the imputation of the law fulfilled, because freedom from the obligation to punishment, and right to the reward, go also together inseparably.
††††††††† For how can he be said (says he) to have all his sins fully forgiven, who is yet looked upon, or intended to be dealt with all, as one that hath transgressed either by way of omission, or commission, any part of the Law? Answer: He that hath his sins fully forgiven, may be well looked upon, as one that hath transgressed, either by omission, or by commission, or by both; because he must be so looked upon: for pardon presupposes sin; no man can be pardoned, but a sinner, and no man can think or dream of a remission, but withal he must suppose, that the person pardoned hath sinned. But it is true, he who is said to have all his sins fully forgiven, cannot be intended to be dealt withal, as one that hath transgressed: for pardon destroys that obligation to punishment, but doth not so destroy sin, as to cause that it never was; for that is impossible. What more? And he that is looked upon as one, that never transgressed any part of the Law, must needs be conceived or looked upon as one, that hath fulfilled or kept the law. Answer: This is also true, taking this imputation of a perfect fulfilling of the law, to be to one, who never broke the law by sin; but it is not true, in our case, who are transgressors, all the imputation of righteousness in the world cannot make us to have been no sinners.
††††††††† Yet he infers, So that besides that perfect remission of sins, which hath been purchased by the blood of Christ, there is no need of (indeed no place for) the imputation of any righteousness, performed by Christ unto the law. Answer: This is but the same thing, which was said, and is manifestly false. Remission regards only the punishment, or the obligation thereunto, and dissolves it, but, as such gives no right to the reward, which was promised only to obedience to the law.
††††††††† But he then tells us more properly, and with Scripture exactness (as he says) that that act of God, whereby he remits and pardons sin, is interpretatively nothing else, but an imputation of a perfect righteousness or of a fulfilling of the law: compare Romans 4: 6 with verses 7 and 11. Answer: This is but the same thing and needs no new answer; for it is denied, that the act of God, whereby he pardons sin, considered in itself, and as such, is interpretatively an imputation of perfect righteousness. But it is true, in our case, it
may be called so interpretatively, in this respect, that there is such an indissoluble connection betwixt the two, that the one infers the other, necessitate consequentis. And this is all that can be proved from Romans 4: 6, 7, 11.
††††††††† He adds, Even as the act of the Physician, by which he recovers his patient from his sickness, may, withal propriety of speech, be called that act, whereby he restores him to his health. Answer: The Physician purging away the humors, the causes of the distemper, is the cause of health, by being the causa removens prohibens; because ex natura rei, health follows upon the removal of that, which caused the distemper; but the connection of pardon and of imputation of righteousness is not ex natura rei, but ex libera Dei constitutione: connecting the causes of both together. His next similitude of the sun, dispelling darkness, and filling the air with light, is as little to the purpose; because here is a natural necessary consequence, light necessarily expelling darkness; which is denied in our case. Hence there is no ground for what he adds, when he says, In like manner, God doth not heal sin, that is forgive sin, by one act, and restore the life of righteousness, that is impute righteousness, by another act at all differing from it, but in and by one and the same punctual and precise act he doth the one and the other. For we are not here enquiring after the oneness or diversity of Godís acts in a philosophical manner: God can do many things by one physical act: but we are enquiring concerning the effects, whether they be one precise thing, flowing from one moral cause; or so diverse, as to require diverse moral causes, and grounds, or whether the one doth naturally and essentially include the other, as being both but one thing.
††††††††† His following words would seem to speak to this, when he says, forgiveness of sins, and imputation of righteousness are but two different names, expressions, or considerations of one and the same thing Ėone and the same act of God is sometimes called forgiveness of sins, and sometimes an imputing of righteousness; and the forgiveness of sins is sometimes called an imputing of righteousness, to show and signify that a man needs nothing to a complete righteousness, or justification, but the forgiveness of his sins: And again the imputing of righteousness is sometimes called the forgiveness of sins, to show that God hath no other righteousness to confer upon a sinner, but that which stands in forgiveness of sins. Answer: This is but gratis dictum; nothing at all is proved: These two, pardon of sins and imputation of righteousness, are two distinct parts of one complete favor, and blessing granted of God, in order to one complete blessedness, consisting likewise in two parts, to wit, in freedom from punishment, which was deserved, and in right to the promised inheritance, which was lost: and because these two, both in the cause, and in the effect, are inseparably conjoined by the Lord; therefore, the mentioning of the one may and doth import and signify both, by a synecdoche: And hence no man, with reason, can infer, that they are both one and the same precise thing, flowing from one and the same precise cause, and import only different names, expressions or considerations of one and the same thing, Christís obedience to the law, and his suffering for sin, were not one and the same thing under various considerations, or names, but distinct parts of one complete Surety-Righteousness: no more can the effects, that flow therefrom, be accounted one and the same
thing, but two distinct parts of one complete effect: And therefore the mentioning of the one, instead of the whole, proves no confusion, or sameness, but rather an inseparableness, which is yielded.
††††††††† He moves an objection against himself ß 5 thus. How can God be said to impute a righteousness to a man, which never was, nor ever had a being, no righteousness (at least of that kind, whereof we now speak) having ever been, but that perfect obedience, which Christ performed to the Law? This indeed is a very rational question; for our author talks much of an imputed righteousness, and never doth, nor yet can tell us, what that is, that can deserve the name of a righteousness. Let us hear, what he answers. 1. Says he, There is as express and complete a righteousness in the law, as ever Christ himself performed. Answer: But what righteousness is or can be in a law, but what is there, by way of prescription? And who doubts of the perfection of this, that acknowledges the perfection of the law? This is utterly impertinent to the purpose in hand, where the question is of a righteousness consisting in conformity to the law, and which must be attributed to man, to whom the law is given? And what if it be said (says he) that God, in remission of sins, through Christ, from and out of the law, imputes to every man, that believes, such a righteousness, as is proper to him? Answer: To say this, is to speak plain non-sense: for what is that to furnish a man with a righteousness out of the law? Can a man be changed into a law, or can a man have any righteousness, prescribed by a law, but by thoughts, words, and deeds, bearing a conformity to the commands of the law? And how can mere pardon cause this transformation? Can the pardon of murder, or any prohibited act, make that act conformed to the law? Pardon thus should be a self destroyer; for an act, that is no transgression of a law, can need no pardon: and thus pardon should make itself no pardon. What he subjoins, hath been spoken to elsewhere.
††††††††† He gives a second answer, saying, To say, God cannot impute a righteousness, which never had a being, i.e. which never was really and actually performed by any man, is to deny that he hath power to forgive sins. Answer: This hath been, and is still, denied; it hath never been, nor never shall be proved, that forgiveness of sins is the imputation of a righteousness. Though he adds from Romans 4: 6 and 3: 28, &c. that it is the imputation of such a righteousness, as consists not, nor is made up of any works performed to the law by any man, which is but a righteousness, that never had a being. Answer: This is but a plain perverting of the Scriptures, which speak only of works (in that exclusion) done and performed by us, as the whole scope, and all the circumstances of the passages, demonstrate to any man, who will not willingly put out his own eyes: and it were a mere imposing upon the understandings of the most ordinary reader, and a miserable misspending of time, to go about the evincing of this, which is so obvious. But what desperate shifts will not a wrong cause put men to use, who will not be Truthís captives?
††††††††† His fifth conclusion comes here also to be considered. It is this: He that is fully discharged from his sins, needs no other righteousness, to give him right and title unto life. This is as false as the rest; for the law is, do this and live: and pardon
for transgressions is not the same as doing the law. What is his reason? Death is the wages of sin, and of sin only, being due to no creature in any other respect, nor upon any other term whatsoever. But what then? Now he that is free of death, and in no way obnoxious thereunto, cannot but be conceived to have a right unto life, there being neither any middle condition between death and life, wherein it is possible for a reasonable creature to subsist, nor again any capacity of life, but by some right and title thereunto. Answer: Though this be true, as to us now, that he who is not obnoxious unto death, hath a right unto life; yet the consequence that he would draw from it is not good: to wit, that that only, which takes away the obnoxiousness unto death, gives also a right to life: because God hath inseparably joined these effects together, as also their distinct causes together, and given them inseparably; so that he who is pardoned hath also a right to life, not merely upon the account, that he is pardoned, but because together with the imputation of the satisfaction of Christ, whence flows pardon, he imputes also Christís righteousness, upon which follows the right to life. And howbeit now, as to us, there is no middle state betwixt these two; yet in Adam there was; for while he stood, he was not obnoxious unto death; and yet he had not right unto life: but was to work out and perfect his task, to that end. But he tells us, While Adam stood, he was already in possession and fruition of life; else he could not be threatened with death. Answer: This is not the life, whereof we are speaking; we are speaking of the life, promised by that covenant, unto perfect obedience: But it seems, that he joins with the Socinians in this, granting no life promised to Adam, but a continuance of what he was already in possession of.
††††††††† He enquires, If he had not a right unto life by his freedom from sin, but was to purchase this right, by an actual fulfilling of the law, it would be known, what quantities of obedience to the law must have been paid, before he had made this purchase; and how long he must have obeyed and kept the law? Answer: There is no necessity of any exact knowledge of these things; our main question doth not stand or fall with the knowledge or ignorance of them. Yet, we may say (and that is sufficient) that the law, or covenant, requiring perfect obedience, and perpetual, without the least omission or commission, he must have paid all that obedience, which the law required of him, to the day of his transmigration, or change to glory, before the purchase had been made. He adds, for had he lived two years in his integrity and uprightness, without the least touch of any transgression, he would still have been a debtor of obedience to the law, upon the same terms, that he was, at the beginning, and the least interruption or breach in the course of his obedience, had even now been the forfeiture of that life he enjoyed. Answer: How long Adam should have lived upon earth, before his translation to glory, we know not; nor is it of use for us to enquire; it is sufficient to know, that he was to finish his course, and to persevere in obedience to the end, if he would not both forfeit the life he had, and the expectation of the life of glory, which was promised upon his completing his work of obedience.
††††††††† He adds, Notwithstanding, the Scriptures of the New Testament seem to place
the immediate right, or capacity, which believers have to the kingdom of heaven and eternal glory, rather in the grace of adoption, than in any righteousness whatsoever, even remission of sins itself not excepted. Answer: I have spoken to this elsewhere, and shall only say here, that thereby he hath destroyed his conclusion; for hereby we see, that in order to the attaining of right to life, more is requisite, than mere remission, for he cannot say, that remission of sins and adoption, is all one, having clearly hinted the contrary here, and having also denied righteousness to be the ground of adoption, while as before he made righteousness and remission of sins all one. He shall never prove that adoption is without the imputation of righteousness. Let us here his reason. The reason whereof may †(haply) be this, because the life and blessedness, which come by Jesus Christ, are of far higher nature, excellency and worth, than that which was covenanted to Adam, by way of wages for his work. or obedience to the law, and therefore require a higher and fuller and richer capacity, or title in the creature, to interesse him therein, than that did: work faithfully performed is enough to entitle a man to his wages, but the gift of an inheritance requires a special grace or favor. Answer: As this is but dubiously asserted, so it is to no purpose; for though some differences may be granted betwixt the glory, now had by the Gospel and that promised to Adam. in several respects; yet it was a life of glory, that was promised to Adam, and our adoption is not without the imputation of a righteousness. Nor was Adamís obedience such a work, as in strict justice called for wages, without a covenant. The imputation of righteousness is indeed a special grace and favor and therefore fit enough to found adoption.
†††††††† His sixth conclusion is this: That satisfaction, which Christ made to the justice of God for sin, and whereby he procured remission of sins (or perfect righteousness) and reconciliation with God for those that believe, consists only in that obedience of his, which he performed to that peculiar and special law of Mediation, which God imposed upon him (which we commonly, though perhaps not altogether so properly, call his passive obedience) and not at all in that obedience or subjection, which he exhibited to that common law of nature, which we call moral. Answer: Though, if we should speak strictly of satisfaction, as distinguished from obedience, and as relating to the punishment of sin, the substance of this conclusion might be granted; Yet taking satisfaction more largely, as relative to our whole debt, it must necessarily include his obedience to the law moral. (2.) Though for explicationís sake, we may speak of Christís active, and of his passive obedience distinctly; yet there was suffering and satisfaction, in all his active obedience (as it is commonly called) and there was action and meriting in all his Passive obedience (as it is commonly called.) His supposing remission of sins, and perfect righteousness, is already discovered to be a mistake. (4.) The special law of Mediation requires of Christ both obedience and suffering, and he speaks without ground, when he restricts it to his passive obedience, (as it is commonly called) only. His reason is, Because nothing can be satisfactory to divine justice for sin, but that which is penal, Hebrews 9: 22, for doubtless, where there is satisfaction, there is and may be remission. Answer: This confirms only what we granted of satisfaction taken strictly. But cannot
prove that satisfaction largely taken, may not, or cannot, yea or must not, include obedience, this being part of our debt to the law, and to the Lawgiver. Nor will it prove, that there was nothing of satisfaction in Christís obedience, which he performed in his state of humiliation. It is true, where there is satisfaction, there is and may be remission; but remission is not all that we stand in need of. But he will have that obedience, which Christ exhibited to the moral law, no way penal: and his reason is, Because it was requisite of man, in his innocency, and imposed by God upon Adam before his fall; yea and still lies and shall lie to the days of eternity upon men and angels. Answer: Yet for all this, it might be and was penal unto Christ, who was not mere man, but God and man in one person: And for him, who was God, and above all law, that man comes under, to subject himself to that law, which was imposed upon man, as a Viator, must needs be penal, it being a part of his subjection, as made under the law, and a piece of his humiliation, for thus, in part, he took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion, as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, Philippians 2: 7, 8; Galatians 4: 4. What they do, who are in glory, is not to the purpose; for here were are speaking of the obedience and subjection of such, as are viators, and not Comprehensors. And Adam while innocent, was a Viator; and Christ, to pay that debt, which was required of us all, as Viators, did humble himself to perform the obedience of a Viator, in our place, and in our stead, that so he might give full satisfaction, and pay our whole debt.
††††††††† From hence, there is no ground for his inference, to wit, that Therefore man was punished, and that by order and appointment of God, before his fall, and that now the glorified saints and angels, yea and Jesus Christ himself, are now punished in heaven. For (1.) it might be and was penal to him, who was God, which was duty unto man in his innocency, as is cleared, and (2.) The obedience of saints and angels, now in glory, and far less that of Jesus Christ himself, (if it can properly be called obedience) is not the duty of Viators, and therefore utterly impertinent to our purpose. We do not say, that Adamís obedience was penal, it being his duty: but Christís was, seeing no law required such obedience of him, who was God; nor was it necessary even to his human nature, in order to life for himself: for the hypostatic union fully removed that necessity, and either made him, as to himself, in respect of his human nature, a Comprehensor, or in the nearest capacity to it, even when he was subjecting himself to the obedience of a Viator, for us, and as standing in our room.
††††††††† But he says, the Scriptures themselves nowhere ascribe this satisfaction to Christís active obedience; but still to his passive. And here he cites many passages of Scripture, to no purpose, seeing none of these give any hint of the exclusion of his active obedience; but rather do include it; or else he may as well say, that all Christís active obedience was no way necessary, or requisite, unto the work of Redemption; because these passages do not expressly say so; and yet this he will not say, seeing he grants that his obedience was an essential requisite, and absolutely necessary, to the constitution of
him our Priest, and his sacrifice propitiatory: But we read of his being made under the law, to redeem these, that were under the law, Galatians 4: 4, 5, and of his righteousness and obedience, as necessary to our righteousness and justification, and as having a no less direct influence into the same; than Adamís offense and disobedience had unto our death and damnation, Romans 5: 17, 18, 19.